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Abstract—Fault analysis and resolution of faults should be 
part of any end-to-end system development process. This paper is 
concerned with developing a formal transformation method that 
maps control flows modeled in UML Activities to semantically 
equivalent Fault Trees. The transformation method developed 
features the use of propositional calculus and probability theory. 
Fault Propagation Chains are introduced to facilitate the 
transformation method. An overarching metamodel comprised of 
transformations between models is developed and is applied to an 
understood Traffic Management System of Systems problem to 
demonstrate the approach. In this way, the relational structure of 
the system behavior model is reflected in the structure of the Fault 
Tree. The paper concludes with a discussion of limitations of the 
transformation method and proposes approaches to extend it to 
object flows, State Machines and functional allocations. 
 
Index Terms—fault propagation chain, fault tree analysis, 
metamodeling, model transformation, system behavior model 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
ince the birth of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) in 1961 at Bell 
Telephone Laboratories [1], FTA has become one of the 
most popular techniques for system safety assessment. More 
recently, from the 1990s to the 2000s, researchers and 
practitioners have been automating Fault Tree generation to 
reduce the time required by producing Fault Trees manually 
and to avoid human errors in manual Fault Tree constructions 
[2],[3]. The key challenge in the automation process, as 
identified by researchers in the field, is actually not the 
automation itself. Rather the challenge is to do with how the 
system should be modeled [2]. For instance, creating a 
comprehensive model for a complex system while maintaining 
sufficient level of detail can be challenging. In addition, a good 
modeling technique in one domain may not be general enough 
to have a wide applicability to cover other engineering 
domains. To tackle this challenge, modeling techniques 
developed for automated Fault Tree generation in the past 
include: model-based approaches such as the use of diagraphs 
[4],[5], state diagrams [6],[7], component-based modeling 
[2],[3], and knowledge-based approaches as reviewed in [8]. 
Despite the various level of success in the adoption of these 
methods in industrial settings, model availability has been one 
of the key issues. For instance, a substantial effort may be 
required to create the sophisticated system models, which is in 
contradiction to the idea of reducing time required in producing 
Fault Trees.  
Much more recently, Model-based Systems Engineering 
(MBSE), a rapidly growing field originated from defense and 
aerospace, has attracted attention from the reliability and safety 
community [9],[10],[11]. In MBSE, modeling techniques and 
languages have been developed to model complex systems and 
System of Systems (SoS). Of the various modeling languages, 
Unified Modeling Language (UML) [12], which was originally 
developed for Software Engineering, became popular in 
Systems Engineering due to its general applicability and 
extendibility. UML has been elaborated into domain-specific 
languages such as the System Modeling Language (SysML) for 
general purpose system modeling [13] and the UML Profile for 
Modeling and Analysis of Real-time Embedded Systems for 
embedded systems [14]. Unlike the previous specific modeling 
techniques developed for automatic Fault Tree generation, 
UML and its extensions can facilitate the modeling of system 
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across various domains.  Nowadays, domains have started 
adopting MBSE approaches using UML; and its extensions are 
becoming widely adopted. Moreover, researchers and 
practitioners have also started using UML and its extensions for 
modeling and analysis from a system safety and reliability 
perspective [10],[11],[12],[13],[14],[15]. As such, for the 
purpose of automated Fault Tree generation, model availability 
is less an issue. However, efficient and reliable transformation 
techniques between models created using these languages and 
Fault Trees remain a challenge.  
Thanks to the development of Transformation Languages, 
such as ATL Transformation Language developed by French 
Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation 
[16] conforming to the Object Management Group standard, 
Query/View/Transformation [17], transformations between 
models developed in different languages and in different 
domains can be more easily achieved technically. 
Researchers and practitioners have developed various ways 
for transforming UML models [18],[19],[20],[21] and SysML 
models [22],[23],[24] to Fault Trees. These transformations 
share the following commonalities: (i) they define 
entity-to-entity types of mapping. For instance, a Use Case in 
UML is mapped onto an intermediate event in a Fault Tree [20]; 
(ii) the transformations developed lack formality; hence they 
lack provable rationales to support the defined mapping.  
Given that Fault Trees are meant to be used to assess system 
reliability and safety, trustworthiness of an automatically 
generated Fault Tree from system models can become 
questionable if the transformation does not have a formal basis. 
To bring formality into the development of system models and 
Fault Trees, attempts in formalizing UML models [11],[25] and 
Fault Trees models [26],[27] have been made independently. 
Further, to enhance consistencies between models developed in 
different domains, major projects such as Comprehensive 
Modeling for Advanced Systems of Systems [28] have 
developed tools and methods for engineers from all range of 
disciplines to provide support in cross-domain collaborations 
[29],[30]. Nonetheless, a formalized transformation method 
between UML models and Fault Tree models is still missing.  
Therefore, in this paper, we seek to bridge this gap by 
developing a mathematically meaningful transformation 
method for generating Fault Trees from UML models. In this 
initial investigation, we focus mainly on system behavior in 
order to limit the scope of the research. To facilitate the 
automation of the developed method, e.g. to implement the 
transformation in ATL, we also abstract the transformation 
concept into an overarching metamodel that bridges a partial 
UML metamodel and a Fault Tree metamodel. Our main 
contributions are: (i) a transformation method comprised of a 
set of semantic mapping rules developed based on 
propositional calculus and probability theory to formally map 
Activity models into Fault Trees; (ii) the concept of Fault 
Propagation Chains as an intermediate step in the 
transformation method; and (iii) an overarching metamodel 
comprised of transformations between Activity models and 
Fault Tree models to facilitate automated Fault Tree generation. 
Unlike existing mapping techniques that focus on 
entity-to-entity mappings, our method reveals an important 
finding where the formal approach suggests that mappings 
should be based on the relational structure between entities.     
To normalize the use of languages from different domains, in 
our work, we adopt definitions of terminologies used in the 
following two standards: UML Specification 2.5 [31] and ARP 
4761 [32].  
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way: in 
Sections II and III, background knowledge on model-based 
approaches to behavior modeling using UML Activities and to 
fault modeling using FTA are provided respectively. In 
addition, metamodels for the two domains are constructed 
based on existing standards. Then, Section IV presents the 
formalization of the model-based approach using propositional 
calculus. Based on the formalization and probability theory, we 
develop the mapping rules for transforming Activity model to 
Fault Trees in Section V. In addition, the transformational 
method is further abstracted into an overarching metamodel in 
this section. To evaluate the transformations developed, we 
apply them to a traffic management system case study in 
Section VI. Finally, in Section VII, we conclude our 
contributions and discuss the limitations of our method, then 
propose research directions for future work. 
II. MODEL-BASED APPROACH TO BEHAVIOR MODELING 
The behaviors of a system directly associate to the execution 
of system functions. And the execution of a system function 
often leads to a change of system states. Hence, the modeling of 
the behaviors of a system can take a functional viewpoint or a 
state viewpoint. In model-based approach with UML, these two 
viewpoints lead to two different model representations: 
Activities and State Machines respectively. This paper focuses 
on Activity model for the purpose of demonstrating the 
development of an overarching metamodel. However, as 
discussed in the Conclusion, the extension of the metamodel to 
include State Machine Diagram is a necessary future step.  
According to International Council on Systems Engineering 
(INCOSE) [33], behavior of a system can be classified into two 
types:  dynamic and emergent. Dynamic behavior of a system is 
based on the time evolution of the system state, whereas 
emergent behavior can be seen collectively in a large scale as it 
cannot be understood in terms of individual system elements 
[33]. In this paper, dynamic behavior is the primary concern.  
A. Activity Diagram as a Behavior Model 
UML Activities specify the sequencing of actions of a system 
or SoS. Here, Action is the technical term and a metaclass used 
in UML to represent the fundamental unit of behavior 
specification [31]. For the rest of the paper, for clarity, we adopt 
Pascal case format, i.e. concatenating capitalized words, in the 
naming of metaclasses, e.g. ActivityNode. In the case of 
modeling system behavior with Activities, an action, 
represented by a node (ExecutableNode), refers to an 
elementary step to be executed by the system. To show the 
sequencing of the steps, the nodes are then connected via edges 
(ActivityEdge). Table I provides a list of graphical notations 
available to the modeling of system behavior in Activities 
 
 
within the scope of this paper. In addition to an executable 
node, Activity modeling also involves the use of other types of 
nodes, e.g. control nodes, and objects. As objects do not 
represent system functions, they will not be considered in this 
paper for the purpose of functional fault analysis. This also 
reduces the graphical complexity of an Activity model to only 
include control flows.  
To describe the execution of an action and the flow of 
controls, UML uses the concepts of tokens (which are not 
explicitly modeled in Activities) and guards. After a function 
completes its execution, a control token will be offered to the 
next node via the edge that connects them. Furthermore, edges 
may have guards on them. A token can only pass through an 
edge with a guard if the guard evaluates the token to true for the 
offered token. Guard is commonly used on the outgoing edges 
of a decision node (DecisionNode). The concept of passing a 
token after the successful execution of an action provides the 
foundation for formalizing control flows by using propositional 
calculus. 
B. Activities Metamodel 
Activities Metamodel serves as a reference to Activity 
modeling by defining the abstract syntax and the 
interrelationship between model elements in the standard 
Activity model [34]. As depicted in Fig. 1, within the scope of 
this paper, only a subset of the UML Activities metamodel is 
considered for the development of the overarching metamodel. 
Metaclasses, such as Object and ObjectFlow are neglected due 
to their irrelevance to fault modeling from a functional 
viewpoint. In addition to this subset, Action metaclass is also 
included based on previous discussions. This metamodel will 
be referred to a Reduced Activity Metamodel (RAM) in the rest 
of the paper.  
In the RAM, at the top level, ActivityNode and ActivityEdge 
are associated with each other through two relations. These 
relations represent the two cases in the modeling of control 
flow: (i) an edge comes after a node, and (ii) a node comes after 
an edge. Detailed descriptions of the lower level metaclasses 
are provided as follows:  
1. The ActivityNode generalizes two types of nodes: 
ExecutableNode and ControlNode. These activity nodes are 
points of intersection where respective operation takes place in 
the Activity model. 
2. The ExecutableNode is the generalization of Action which 
specifies the actions to be executed in the Activity model. The 
proposition that describes an action is captured within the 
Action symbol (Table I). 
3. The ControlNode generalizes a set of paired nodes that are 
used to manage different types of control flows. These node 
pairs are: (i) InitialNode and FinalNode which are used to 
indicate the starting and ending point of a flow respectively; (ii) 
ForkNode and JoinNode which are used to specify concurrent 
flows; and (iii) DecisionNode and MergeNode which are used 
to specify alternative flows. Although the pairings are not 
reflected in the RAM, paired usage has been regarded as 
necessary practice for semantic consistency. As many of these 
control nodes allow multiple coexisting (concurrent and 
alternative) flows to be modeled, it is therefore possible to have 
situations where a single activity node is associated to multiple 
activity edges. These situations are covered by multiplicity on 
the association line where an asterisk symbol is depicted toward 
the ActivityEdge end.  
4. In the UML 2.5 specification, guard is not explicitly 
captured by a metaclass [31]. Instead, the metamodel uses the 
TABLE I 
ACTIVITY MODEL SYMBOLS 
Symbol Description 
 Action – action state of system behavior 
 
Control Flow – directional activity flow of control 
nodes and action states 
 Initial Node – initial  state of activity flow
 
 
Activity Final Node – final state of activities 
completion 
 
Decision Node  – point of alternate paths decision   
 
Merge Node – point of multiple flows merge to a 
single flow without synchronization 
 
Fork Node – point of single flow splits to multiple 
flows 
 
Join Node – point of multiple flows synchronize to 
a single flow   
 
Swimlane – classify and hold activity flows 
according to systems in partitions 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Reduced Activity Metamodel extracted from the UML Specification 
[31]. 
 
 
  
 
 
concept of ValueSpecification. 
III. MODEL-BASED APPROACH TO FAULT ANALYSIS 
 Model-based approach to fault analysis, such as FTA, 
Reliability Block Diagrams, Binary Decision Diagrams, 
Dependency Diagram, and Markov Analysis are widely used 
for system safety assessment. Safety Analysts often use these 
model-based techniques to evaluate system architecture to 
quantify probabilities of occurrence of system failures, and to 
identify potential related risks. In this section, we provide 
essential background knowledge in FTA and construct a Fault 
Tree Metamodel (FTM) based on safety standard ARP 4761 
[32]. 
A. Fault Tree Analysis 
FTA is a conventional system analysis technique for 
assessing safety in the development of a system. It is a 
deductive failure analysis method for determining the causes of 
undesired events. Table II presents a list of basic notations in 
FTA used in this paper based on ARP 4761 [32]. IEC 61025, a 
specific standard of FTA, defines two types of FTA: static and 
dynamic [35]. Other methods such as dynamic FTA [36] and 
Fuzzy FTA [37] will not be considered in this paper. In brief, in 
conventional FTA, qualitative evaluation is concerned with 
identifying information such as failure paths with the use of 
minimal cut sets; and quantitative evaluation is concerned with 
determining the probability of the top event.  
B. Fault Tree Metamodel 
A standardized metamodel for Fault Tree currently remains 
unspecified [20]. Several research efforts have contributed to 
the construction of a generic metamodel for Fault Tree. For 
instance, the generic Component Fault Tree (CFT) Metamodel 
[38] and a Fault Tree metamodel [20] are developed based on 
different viewpoints. CFT Metamodel is constructed based on 
the hierarchical decomposition of a system. It emphasizes on 
the concepts of Component and Component Proxies based on 
component-based software development. Whilst, the latter 
metamodel is constructed based on the FaultCat analysis tool. 
Despite the different viewpoints, the two metamodels share a 
common set of metaclasses, e.g. Event and Gate (logic), which 
represent the backbone structure of a Fault Tree. 
Metamodels of Fault Tree developed in the researches are 
further extended and applied in other areas. For instance, the 
CFT Metamodel has been further integrated with Architecture 
Domain Specific Modeling Language to reduce efforts and 
times needed for safety analysis; and the integration also leads 
to potential reusable models. The metamodel developed in [20] 
is being used for dependability analysis between UML model 
and Fault Tree. In this paper, metamodel of Fault Tree is 
developed for the purpose of unifying system functional 
architecture and system failure analysis. 
The FTM developed in this paper, as depicted in Fig. 2, is 
constructed based on ARP 4761 [32]. Similar to the 
construction of the RAM, we use Pascal case format to denote a 
metaclass name to distinguish it from the name of an actual 
model element.  Individual metaclass is explained as follows: 
1. The main elements in Fault Tree model are events, 
branches, and logic gates. Hence, they are abstracted into 
metaclasses at the highest-level as Event, Branch, and Logic 
metaclasses respectively in the FTM. Similar to how 
ActivityEdge and ActivityNode are connected in the RAM, 
Branch is associated to both Event and Logic also by two-way 
relations. The multiplicity also reflects situations where an 
event (or logic gate) can be associated with one or more 
multiple branches going into the event (or logic gate) and out of 
the event (or logic gate). 
 
Fig. 2. Fault Tree Metamodel developed based on ARP 4761 [32]. 
 
 
 
TABLE II 
FAULT TREE SYMBOLS 
Symbol Description 
 
Output Event – event which is an output of a logic 
symbol (refer as top event or intermediate event) 
 
Basic Event – event which is internal to a system 
without further development 
 
External Event – event which is external to a system 
 
Undeveloped Event – event which has little impact to 
the top event without further development 
 
Conditional Event – event of a necessary condition for 
a failure mode to occur 
 
Transfer Event – event which indicates a fault tree 
information is transferred out to another fault tree or 
transferred into fault tree 
 
AND-Gate – Boolean logic gate – output event occur 
when all intermediate events occurred 
 
OR-Gate - Boolean logic gate – output event occur 
when at least one intermediate event occurred 
 
Priority AND-Gate - Boolean logic gate – output event 
occur when all intermediate events occurred in a specific 
sequence (sequence usually represented by a conditional 
event ) 
 
Inhibit-Gate – Boolean logic gate – output event occur 
with the presence of an enabling conditional event 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Event metaclass consists of OutputEvent, PrimaryEvent, 
TransferEvent, and ConditionalEvent, each representing the 
corresponding type of event seen in Fault Trees (c.f. Table II). 
The PrimaryEvent further generalizes BasicEvent, 
UndevelopedEvent, and ExternalEvent. The TransferEvent is a 
generalization of TransferredIn and TransferredOut which 
represents the existence of external branch of Fault Trees. 
3. Logic metaclass consists of ANDGate, PriorityANDGate, 
ORGate, and InhibitGate which is used to evaluate input 
branches and tie the branches together. 
4. ConditionalEvent is associated with PriorityANDGate or 
InhibitGate. This reflects the use of conditional event in Fault 
Tree construction where a priority AND-gate and inhibit-gate is 
always accompanied with a conditional event specified in an 
oval shape (c.f. Table II).  
IV. FORMALIZATION USING PROPOSITIONAL CALCULUS 
The model-based approach in Section II led to the 
specification of a UML metamodel for behavior modeling. 
These were adapted from currently accepted graphical models 
which are not formal. Formalizing these models in the 
propositional calculus will facilitate transformation between 
behavior and fault models. 
A. The Propositional Calculus 
Proposition is an assertion that expresses premise conclusion 
or argument which can be expressed in symbol or variable [39]. 
The propositional calculus is the part of mathematical logic 
where the validity of an argument depends only on how the 
propositional sentences are formed and not on the internal 
structure of the propositions. This is sufficient for the modeling 
and analysis of functional faults. Specifically, the propositions 
of interest will be of the following form: 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖: The action 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 completed execution.           (1) 
 
 Note that this is a decidable declarative statement which has 
a yes-no answer; and therefore adheres Boolean calculus of 
evaluation of truth. The action 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 can then be associated with 
{1,0} or {T, F} values. The truth values of the propositions will 
be regarded as outcomes of a designed experiment. 
 It is useful to view a coin tossing experiment from this 
behavioral viewpoint. The action 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  can be stated as: the coin 
was flipped. Specifying the outcome is part of the design of the 
experiment. This could be as simple as specifying the coin 
began in one state {Head,Tail}, underwent a random change of 
state, and resulted in the coin coming to rest in a state 
determined by the side of the coin facing up when the process 
completed execution. This process could fail to complete 
execution if, for example, either change was not random or the 
coin somehow came to rest on its edge. The outcome of this 
behavior is silent on the end state of the coin. A second 
proposition could be introduced to complete the experiment; 
but this would not be a behavioral proposition. 
 It is important to note in this simple example, how the 
specification of the experiment immediately led to details 
associated with the internal structure of the behavioral 
proposition, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 . Further analysis of behavior and faults 
involving nonfunctional properties will need the predicate 
calculus, which is a separate concern than what is presented in 
this paper. 
B. Representation of Behavioral Faults 
The sentences of interest will be well-formed formulae 
consisting of the types of propositions in (1). These will be 
referred to as behavioral propositions. For any two 
propositions, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  and 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗, the sentences are declarations in one of 
the following forms or a negation of the form: 
 ¬𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖        𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗         𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∨ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗         𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 → 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 .    (2) 
 
where ¬𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  is the negation of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∧  𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗  is a logical 
conjunction between two behavioral propositions;  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∨ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 is a 
logical disjunction between two behavioral propositions; and 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 → 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 is  material implication, which is read as 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  implies 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗. 
The proposition 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠  will also be used and reserved for the 
completion of the overall execution of the system functions 
within a given Activity model. 
The analyst has choices as to how faults should be presented. 
From a logical viewpoint it can be useful to consider collections 
of propositions in disjunctive normal form [40], for example: 
 
(𝑝𝑝1 ∧  𝑝𝑝2) ∨ (𝑝𝑝3 ∧  𝑝𝑝4) .      (3) 
 
These might be associated with a logical transition to a 
system behavior 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  or its failure ¬ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 . For the rest of paper, the 
negated proposition is also defined as a fault event, 
 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ≝ ¬ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖: The action 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 failed to complete execution. (4) 
 
Correspondingly, the proposition, 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 , is reserved for overall 
system failure. In the language of Fault Tree, this will be 
regarded as the top event within the scope of this paper. 
C. Control Flows as Implication Chains 
A control flow models a sequence of actions in an Activity 
model. Two adjacent actions, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 and 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1 in a control flow can 
then be described as 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 precedes 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1. Assuming that there are 
no other actions preceding 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1,, one can infer that if 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1 has 
completed its execution, then the action 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  must have also 
completed its execution. Using the propositions introduced in 
(1), we express the above statement logically by a material 
implication, 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+1→ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  .         (5)  
 
Control flows involving concurrent and alternative flows , 
can then be expressed by conjunctions and disjunctions of these 
implications to form a Logical Model, e.g. the control flows 
depicted in the Activity model in Fig. 8 of Section VI. In the 
following subsection, we will show how to transform these 
implications to describe fault structures.  
D. Fault Propagation Chains 
To transform a Logical Model into behavioral fault 
representation, instead of using the negation of individual 
action proposition, e.g. ¬ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, we apply the contrapositive to the 
material implication in (5). Incorporating the definition of a 
 
 
fault event given in (4), we define the contrapositive form of 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+1 → 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  as, 
 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 → 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+1  ≝ ¬ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 → ¬ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+1 .      (6) 
 
This expression can be interpreted as follows: if the action 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
failed to complete execution, then action 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1  will fail to 
execute. This statement also makes sense from the behavioral 
viewpoint described in an Activity model. For instance, if 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
failed to complete execution, a token will not be generated and 
passed onto the next action, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1. Hence, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1 will not execute. 
The consequence of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1 failing to execute can be therefore 
understood by the concept of fault propagation.    
Using the contrapositive form in (6) as the basis, we further 
introduce a chain of material implications to model fault 
propagations in a control flow: 
 
(𝑎𝑎1 →  𝑎𝑎2) ∧ (𝑎𝑎2 →  𝑎𝑎3) ∧ … ∧ (𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 →  𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛) ,  (7) 
 
where each (⋯)  describes a unit of fault propagation between 
two adjacent actions and a chain is only permitted to be a 
conjunction of these fault propagation units as defined in (6). 
Multiple chains may be combined by a conjunction or 
disjunction; and this will be discussed in Section V in detail. 
Some event structures may involve the use of disjunctions, for 
example: 
 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  ∨  𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 → 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 .                                  (8) 
 
By refactoring, a form using conjunctions instead, may be 
produced: 
 (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 → 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘)  ∧ (𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 → 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘) .                          (9) 
 
However, note that this is not a chain because the antecedent of 
the second material implication is not the consequent of the first 
material implication.  
For situations where an event structure reads, 
 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∧ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 →  𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 ,         (10) 
 
we define the conjunction of the multiple fault events as a 
contracted fault event, for example, for two events in 
conjunction, we have 
 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗  ≝  𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∧ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 .        (11) 
 
We define the logical forms used in (7), (9), (10) and (11) for 
describing fault event structures Conjunctive Material Form 
(CMF). Specifically, this is a conjunction of material 
implications in which the two propositions within each material 
implication can be a conjunction. The primary reason for 
introducing CMF and contracted fault events is to simplify the 
representation of a long logic formula into simpler chains of 
implications. Although not all logic formulae can be written in 
CMF, we will demonstrate in the next section that the 
transformation method is applicable to chains that are in CMF 
as well as combined chains that are not in CMF. In the rest of 
the paper, the graphical representation of chains of implications 
will be referred to as a Fault Propagation Chain (FPC).  
V. FROM ACTIVITIES TO FAULT TREES 
In this section the logical formalization of UML Activities is 
used as the basis to develop a set of semantic mapping rules to 
transform system behavior as represented by Activity models to 
behavioral faults as represented by FPCs. Probability theory 
[41] is then applied to further transform the FPCs into a 
conventional Fault Tree representation. The section begins with 
transformation of elementary control flows modeled in UML 
Activity diagrams to semantically equivalent Fault Trees. 
Section VI will demonstrate the approach by applying the 
transformation method to an elementary case study that is well 
understood.  
The application of the method to broader classes of 
engineering problems can be understood in two ways. The first 
includes complicated problems (i.e. with similar form but 
greater detail than the elementary forms and case study) that 
can be reduced to conjunctive structures. These will simply 
result in longer CMF forms, such as in (7), or longer 
conjunctions than the elementary form in (11). Complexity, on 
the other hand, can arise from combinations of disjunctive 
forms with conjunctive and material forms that do not 
necessarily admit reduction into a single chain. Complexity is 
addressed at the end of this section by means of transforming a 
nested control structure into a Fault Tree.  
A. Semantic Mapping Rules: Activities to Fault Propagation 
Chains 
Based on the formalization introduced in the previous 
section, representative types of elementary control flows seen 
in typical Activity model are semantically mapped into logical 
models, i.e. implication chains, and then transformed into FPCs 
by applying the contraposition of the logical models. Finally, 
graphical representations of the FPC are depicted. Starting with 
the graphical control flows and ending with the graphical FPC, 
for every elementary control flow structure, each stage of the 
semantic mapping is depicted in Table III. Detailed discussion 
on the various control flow structures and their associated 
semantic mapping rules are provided below: 
1. The control flow presented in (a) consists of two actions 
sequenced in series. As already discussed in Section IV, this 
control flow can be modeled by using propositional logic as 
𝑝𝑝2 →  𝑝𝑝1, i.e. the completed execution of 𝐴𝐴2 implies that the 
execution of 𝐴𝐴1  must have been completed. Then, applying 
contraposition to the logic model, we derive a fault propagation 
chain that reads 𝑎𝑎1 → 𝑎𝑎2. 
2. Row (b) and (c) are concerned with the control flows that 
involve a pair of folk and join nodes. In (b), one action flows 
into two concurrent actions via a fork node while in (c), two 
concurrent actions flow into a single action via a join node. 
 
 
The logical model for (b) can be formulated as 𝑝𝑝2 ∨ 𝑝𝑝3 → 𝑝𝑝1, which means that the completed execution of either 𝐴𝐴2 or 
𝐴𝐴3 implies that 𝐴𝐴1 has been executed. Applying contraposition 
to the logical model leads to the expression 𝑎𝑎1 → (𝑎𝑎2 ∧ 𝑎𝑎3) or 
equivalently, (𝑎𝑎1 → 𝑎𝑎2) ∧ (𝑎𝑎1 → 𝑎𝑎3).  
The logical model for (c) can be formulated as 𝑝𝑝4 → (𝑝𝑝2 ∧
𝑝𝑝3), which means that the completed execution of 𝐴𝐴4 implies 
that both 𝐴𝐴2 and 𝐴𝐴3  must have been completed. Applying 
contrapositive to the logical model leads to the expression (𝑎𝑎2 ∨ 𝑎𝑎3) → 𝑎𝑎4. However, this is not in the CMF introduced in 
Section IV. Hence, by using (9), we refactor the expression into 
a CMF that reads (𝑎𝑎2 → 𝑎𝑎4) ∧ (𝑎𝑎3 → 𝑎𝑎4). Immediately, one 
realizes that how this CMF connects naturally with the previous 
CMF  (𝑎𝑎1 → 𝑎𝑎2) ∧ (𝑎𝑎1 → 𝑎𝑎3) in (b) to form two concurrent 
chains, (𝑎𝑎1 → 𝑎𝑎2) ∧ (𝑎𝑎2 → 𝑎𝑎4)  and (𝑎𝑎1 → 𝑎𝑎3) ∧ (𝑎𝑎3 → 𝑎𝑎4) . 
The FPC is depicted in the last column in (b) and (c), where 𝑎𝑎1 
bifurcates into two chains and converge back into one chain at 
𝑎𝑎4. 
3. Row (d) and (e) are concerned with the control flows 
involving a pair of decision and merge nodes. Different from 
(b), one action can only flows into one of the two paths based 
on the decision being made. Hence, only one of the two later 
actions, 𝐴𝐴2  and 𝐴𝐴3 can be executed. Then, in (e), the two paths 
merge into a single path where the control sequence flows 
either from 𝐴𝐴2 to 𝐴𝐴4 or from 𝐴𝐴3 to 𝐴𝐴4. 
Although the control flow in (d) is very different from (b), 
they share the same logical model (𝑝𝑝2 ∨ 𝑝𝑝3) → 𝑝𝑝1 . This is 
because that no matter which path is taken, as long as there is a 
completed execution of either 𝐴𝐴2  or 𝐴𝐴3 , 𝐴𝐴1  must have been 
executed. Similarly, the contrapositive of the logical model can 
be expressed as 𝑎𝑎1 → (𝑎𝑎2 ∧ 𝑎𝑎3). Further using the definition of 
a contracted fault event introduced in (11), we arrive at a FPC 
for (d) that reads 𝑎𝑎1 → 𝑎𝑎2,3.` 
The logical model for (e) can be formulated as 𝑝𝑝4 → (𝑝𝑝2 ∨
𝑝𝑝3) (this is different from (c)), which means that the completed 
execution of 𝐴𝐴4 implies that either 𝐴𝐴2 or 𝐴𝐴3 has been executed. 
Applying contraposition to the logical model leads to the 
expression (𝑎𝑎2 ∧ 𝑎𝑎3) → 𝑎𝑎4. Similarly, this expression becomes 
𝑎𝑎2,3 → 𝑎𝑎4  by defining the conjunction on the left as a 
contracted fault event. The two FPC in (d) and (e) also connect 
naturally to form a single chain, (𝑎𝑎1 → 𝑎𝑎2,3) ∧ (𝑎𝑎2,3 → 𝑎𝑎4) , 
where 𝑎𝑎2,3 ≝ 𝑎𝑎2 ∧ 𝑎𝑎3 is a contracted fault event as defined in 
(11). 
B. Fault Propagation Chains: Probability Analysis 
In conventional FTA, the edges connecting lower and higher 
level events do not possess a well-defined semantic meaning. 
For instance, an edge may mean composition where a higher 
level event is composed by a lower event and another different 
lower event by an AND-gate; an edge can also mean causality 
where an intermediate event is caused by either one of the basic 
events that are connected by an OR-gate. In contrast, the 
TABLE III 
SEMANTIC MAPPING RULES 
Control Flow Logical Model Contrapositive Fault Propagation 
 
𝑝𝑝2 
↓ 
𝑝𝑝1 
¬ 𝑝𝑝1 ¬ 𝑝𝑝2 ↓ ≝ 𝑎𝑎1 𝑎𝑎2 ↓  
(a) 
 
𝑝𝑝2  ∨  𝑝𝑝3 
𝑝𝑝1 ↓ ¬ 𝑝𝑝1 ↓ ¬ 𝑝𝑝2  ∧ ¬ 𝑝𝑝1 
 
↓¬ 𝑝𝑝3 
 
≝ 
𝑎𝑎1 
𝑎𝑎2 
↓ ∧ 
𝑎𝑎1 
𝑎𝑎3 
↓ 
 
(b) 
 
𝑝𝑝4 
𝑝𝑝2  ∧  𝑝𝑝3 ↓ ¬ 𝑝𝑝2 ↓  ¬ 𝑝𝑝4 ∧ ¬ 𝑝𝑝3↓¬ 𝑝𝑝4  ≝ 𝑎𝑎2 𝑎𝑎4 ↓ ∧ 𝑎𝑎3 𝑎𝑎4 ↓ 
 
(c) 
 
𝑝𝑝2  ∨  𝑝𝑝3 
𝑝𝑝1 ↓ ¬ 𝑝𝑝1 ↓ ¬ 𝑝𝑝2 ∧ ¬ 𝑝𝑝3 ≝ 𝑎𝑎1 ↓ 𝑎𝑎2 ∧ 𝑎𝑎3  
(d) 
 
𝑝𝑝4 
𝑝𝑝2 ∨  𝑝𝑝3 ↓ ¬ 𝑝𝑝2 ∧ ¬ 𝑝𝑝3 ¬ 𝑝𝑝4 ↓ ≝ 𝑎𝑎2 ∧  𝑎𝑎3 𝑎𝑎4 ↓  
(e) 
 
 
 
 
 
directed edges in the FPC proposed in this paper mean exactly 
material implications and fault propagates along these directed 
edges.  
In the case of series (and non-exclusive), an FPC can be 
thought as the conjunction of a combination of non-repeating 
elementary units of the form 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 → 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 , (𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗) where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  can be a 
contracted fault event; and a disjunction in the case of exclusive 
chains. For every elementary unit, one can ask the question: 
what is the truth value of 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 given a truth value of 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 being True 
(or False)? The answer can be obtained from building a truth 
table: if 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 is True, then 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 is True; but if  𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 is False, 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 can be 
either True or False. Assuming that one can define a probability 
for the fault event 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  being True, we can then conduct an 
observation experiment to count the number of times that event 
𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 has returned a True value. One would then observe that the 
probability of 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 denoted as 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗) , is greater than the 
probability of 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  denoted as 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) , i.e. 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗) ≥ 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖). This 
mathematical fact, interpreted in the language of fault analysis, 
immediately leads to the concept of fault propagation. For 
instance, if the fault event, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  has happened, one conclude 
automatically that 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 will happen; and if 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 has not happened, 
𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 may still happen. 
To better describe the probability of the occurrence of these 
fault events, with the aid of Fig. 3(a), the following definitions 
and notations will be adopted: 
Definition 1: 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) is defined as the probability of the fault 
event, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , independent of the occurrence of any other fault 
events, i.e. prior faults propagated to 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, if any, are not counted 
toward 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖).   
Definition 2: 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+)  is defined as the probability of 
observing a system failure right after the (supposed) execution 
of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 . Similarly, one can also define a probability 
measurement, 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−), as the probability of observing a system 
failure just before the execution of action, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 . In the simple 
construct shown in Fig. 3(a), one notices that 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+) =
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗−�. Note that 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+ and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖− are fictitious events that are not 
originally presented in the Activity model. 
Using the above definitions, for any given chain, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 → 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 , 
one can establish the following mathematical relations: 
 
�
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−) + 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−)𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+� = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+) + 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+)𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� , (12) 
 
with 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+) = 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗−�. To see how these relations are derived, 
let us consider the following thought experiment [41]. An 
observer runs the system for n times and observes the number 
of system failures, i.e. failed to complete the intended system 
behavior as modeled in the UML Activity. Up to the point at 
where system function 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  is about to execute, the observer 
would measure a probability of system failure equal to 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−) 
based on Definition 2. Then, statistically, there are 𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−) 
number of experiments in which the system would fail at this 
point and 𝑛𝑛�1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−)� number of experiments in which the 
system successfully proceed to the execution of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. Given that 
there is a probability of failure in the execution of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, i.e. 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖), 
based on Definition 1, in addition to the experiments in which 
the system failed before the execution of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, the observer would 
further expect a  𝑚𝑚 = 𝑛𝑛�1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−)��𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)�  number of 
experiments in which the system would fail right after the 
supposed execution of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. Therefore, one can calculate 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+) 
by the quotient of the total number of failed events at this point 
and the total number of experiments as, 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+) = 𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−) + 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛  
  = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−) + �1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−)��𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)�     
 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−) + 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−)𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) .    (13)  
     
The second relation in (12) can be derived using exactly the 
same concept.  
In a simplified case where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 is assumed to be the first fault 
event in the entire chain, i.e. 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−) = 0, the relations reduce 
to: 
 
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+� = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) + 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� .  (14) 
 
The relation in (13) and (14) will form the basis for the analysis 
of FPCs and the transformation of FPCs to Fault Trees. 
As shown in Table III, certain control flows after the 
transformation can lead to bifurcation and convergence in the 
FPC. In these cases, the probability calculation needs to be 
carefully dealt with to avoid over-counting of the probability of 
repeated events. Using the example depicted in Fig. 3(b), based 
on the derived relations in (12) and (14), one can establish the 
following relations: 
 
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0) + 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0)𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+� = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0) + 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0)𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗�
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘−) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+) + 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+� − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+)𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+|𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+)
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘+) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘−) + 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘) − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘−)𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘)  ,  (15) 
 
with 𝑎𝑎0  being an initial fault event, i.e. no other fault 
propagates to it. The first and second relations in (15) are 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
Fig. 3. Examples of Fault Propagation Chains: (a) series propagation; (b) 
bifurcated and merged propagation. 
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derived based on the result in (14) by considering the 
bifurcation as two parallel (non-exclusive) chains, i.e. 𝑎𝑎0 to 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖; 
and 𝑎𝑎0  to 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗  respectively. The fourth relation can be derived 
using the same thought experiment in deriving the relations in 
(12). 
The derivation of the third relation in (15) requires a 
consideration of the repeated event, 𝑎𝑎0 in the convergence of 
the two paths. Instead of directly using the relations derived in 
(12), let us come back to the thought experiment in which the 
observer runs the system of n times. Based on previous 
derivations, the observer would first expect 𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0) number of 
system failures due to the failed execution of 𝐴𝐴0. The observer 
would also expect an additional 𝑚𝑚 = 𝑛𝑛�1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0)��𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)� 
number of system failures right after the supposed execution of 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ; and an additional 𝑞𝑞 = 𝑛𝑛�1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0)� �𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗�� number of 
systems failures right after the supposed execution of 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗. As 
such, the total number of system failures right before the 
execution of 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘 is given by 𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0) + 𝑚𝑚 + 𝑞𝑞. This then allows 
us to calculate 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘−), as 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘−) = 𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0) + 𝑚𝑚 + 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛  
  = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0) + 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0)𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) + 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� −
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0)𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗�               
 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+) + 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+� − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0),         (16) 
 
where the last step has used the first two relations in (15) as 
substitutions. In this representation, as seen in Fig. 3(b), 𝑎𝑎0 is a 
repeated event, and hence, can be considered as the intersection 
of the two events, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+ and 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+ in which  
 
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+ ∩ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+� = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+)𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+� = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0),   (17) 
 
where 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+|𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+) is the conditional probability of  𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+ given 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+. Substituting (17) into (16) would arrive the third relation in 
(15). It is worth noting that due to the presence of the repeated 
event, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+  and 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+  can be dependent. For instance, if an 
observation of 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+ returns a True value due to the occurrence of 
the repeated event, 𝑎𝑎0, immediately, one would expect 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+ to 
return a True value as well. However, if the observation of 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+ 
returns a True value due to the occurrence of 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  instead of 𝑎𝑎0, 
an observation of 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+  may or may not return a True value 
depending whether 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 has occurred or not. The situation where 
a repeated fault event happens in a FPC is analogous to a 
repeated basic event seen in a conventional Fault Tree.  
A contracted fault event, such as 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 , can be viewed 
identically as a normal fault event such that it follows exactly 
the same analysis rule. However, from both the system 
modeling viewpoint and fault analysis viewpoint, it can be 
useful to understand how individual fault event embedded in 
the contraction can affect the overall FPC. Tracing back to the 
Activity model, a contracted event embeds exclusive paths, i.e. 
if one path is taken, no other paths will be taken. Theoretically, 
it is possible to attribute each of the paths a probability for 
which it might be taken. The sum of the probabilities has to be 
exactly one; this is to reflect that a path is always taken. Now, 
coming back to the fault analysis viewpoint, an embedded fault 
event then becomes only relevant when its corresponding path 
(in the Activity model) is taken. This allows one to establish the 
mathematical relation as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗� = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) + 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗�𝑃𝑃�𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗� ,   (18) 
 
where 𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) is the probability of the system taking the path, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖. 
Note also that 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 and 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 are not fault events and that they are 
mutually exclusive. The conditional statement, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, traces back 
to the guard contents on an activity edge in a control flow that 
contains a decision node (c.f. first column of Table III-(d)). 
C. Semantic Transformations: Fault Propagation Chains to 
Fault Tree  
The probability definitions proposed for the analysis of FPCs 
are based on a theoretical concept where the failed execution of 
an action (system function), i.e. 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, can be somehow observed 
experimentally. However, in reality, a failed execution of a 
system function may only be observed when the function is 
implemented, for example on hardware. In terms of system 
behavior and structure modeling, this is often referred to as 
allocation of system functions to system components. For 
example, if a system function, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, is allocated to two system 
components, then each individual failure rate of the two 
components will contribute to the calculation of the probability 
of functional failure, 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) . As such, a different allocation 
strategy will likely result in different Fault Tree structure when 
physical components are considered. As this paper is only 
concerned with system behavioral faults, we push the allocation 
mechanism into the next-level of detail in the decomposition 
process of FTA, and this will be a topic of a future work. 
Taking the FPC in Fig. 3(a) as an example, with a simplified 
situation where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 is the first fault event in the entire chain, i.e. 
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−) = 0,  the FPC can be transformed into a Fault Tree that 
consists of an OR-gate as depicted in Fig. 4(a). This is because 
that based on (14), 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+� can be considered as a union of 
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) and 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗�, where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 and 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 are basic events, and 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+ is 
an intermediate event that can further contributes to the 
probability calculation of fault events after 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 . If there is no 
fault even after 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 , then the intermediate event 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+  can be 
replaced by the top event, “system failure”, 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠. 
For the FPC in Fig. 3(b), following the transformation 
developed above, one can also translate the set of equations in 
(14) exactly into Fault Tree probability calculations in the 
following way:  
 
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0 OR 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+� = 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎0 OR 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗�
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘−) = 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+ OR 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+�
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘+) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘− OR 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘)  ,    (19) 
 
with 
 
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  OR 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� = 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∪ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) + 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� − 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� ,   (20) 
 
 
 
and the intersection 
 
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖� = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗)𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖|𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗) ,  (21) 
 
if 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 and 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 are dependent events. And the intersection reduces 
to  
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� ,      (22) 
 
if 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 and 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 are independent. 
 The new set of equations in (19) can be immediately depicted 
graphically in a Fault Tree, as shown in Fig. 4(b), by defining 
𝑎𝑎0, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗, and 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 as basic events (independent of each other), 
and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+, 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+, 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘−, and 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘+ as intermediate events.  
For a contracted fault event, at the contraction level, it can be 
treated similar to a normal fault event. Hence, the mapping to 
Fault Tree is straightforward. For the fault events embedded in 
the contraction, one can translate (18) into 
 
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗� = 𝑃𝑃((𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) ∪ (𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ∩ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗)) .       (23) 
 
The Fault Tree corresponding to this equation is depicted in 
Fig. 4(c). Because 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 and 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 are not fault events, but conditional 
statements, instead of using the normal AND-gates, 
inhibit-gates are used. Moreover, expanding the expression on 
the right hand side of the above equation, one would expect an 
intersection term that reads, (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) ∩ (𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ∩ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗) . However, 
this term yields zero as 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 and 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 are mutually exclusive events. 
D. Nested Control Flows  
In this section, we demonstrate that the transformation 
method is not limited to simple connections of elementary 
control flows, but is also applicable to complex control flows 
that involve the nesting of elementary control flows. We apply 
the transformation method to the nested control flow shown in 
Fig. 5(a) to obtain a semantically equivalent fault tree. It is 
worth noting that in this nested control flow, Action, 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 does 
not proceed to the Action, 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚. 
Using the elementary control flows as the basis, the structure 
of the nested control flow can be logically expressed by the 
following expressions,  
 
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∨ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗) → 𝑝𝑝0
𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 → (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∨ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗)(𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 ∨ 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛) → 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓 → (𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 ∨ 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛) ,       (24) 
     
Applying contraposition to the expressions in (24), we arrive at 
the following elementary units, 
 
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ (𝑎𝑎0 → 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) ∧ �𝑎𝑎0 → 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� = 𝑎𝑎0 → (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∧ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗)(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 → 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛) ∨ �𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 → 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛� = (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∧ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗) → 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 → 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚) ∧ (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 → 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛) = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 → (𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 ∧ 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛)(𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 → 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓) ∨ �𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 → 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓� = (𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 ∧ 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛) → 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 ,  (25a) 
  
or alternatively, using the concept of contracted fault event, we 
have, 
 
�
𝑎𝑎0 → 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 → 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 → 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛
𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛 → 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓  ,        (25b) 
 
Although the conjunction of the above relations, 
 (𝑎𝑎0 → 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗) ∧ (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 → 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛) ∧ (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 → 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛) ∧ (𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛 → 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓), (26) 
 
is in CMF, this is not a chain as described in (7) because it 
breaks at ⋯𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛) ∧ (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ⋯. To resovle this issue, we introduce 
only one contracted fault event, 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛, such that the FPC can be 
expressed by a disjunction of the two relations, 
 
�
(𝑎𝑎0 → 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) ∧ �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 → 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛� ∧ �𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛 → 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓�(𝑎𝑎0 → 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗) ∧ �𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 → 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛� ∧ �𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 → 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓� ,  (27) 
 
in which these two chains are two mutually exlusive paths. We 
 
(a) 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
(c) 
 
Fig. 4. Examples of Fault Trees transformed from various Fault Propagation 
Chains where (a) is transformed from FPC in Fig. 3(a); (b) is transformed from 
FPC in Fig. 3(b); and (c) is derived from an expanded contracted fault event.  
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emphasize that as a FPC, (27) is not in CMF due to having a 
disjunction in between the two relations.  
Continuing with (27), we depict the FPC in Fig. 5(b). In 
addition to the bifurcation, we also indicate the necessary 
condition for each of the exclusive chains resulted from the 
disjunction of the two relations in (27). Based on the 
transformation method develoepd in the previous subsection, 
we transform the FPC into a Fault Tree that is depicted in Fig. 
5(c), in which the detailed probability analysis for the FPC in 
Fig. 5(b) is provided in Appnedix I. The minimal cut sets of this 
Fault Tree are: {𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜}, {𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖}, {𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 , 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗}, {𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 , 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚, 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚}, {𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 , 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛}, 
{𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 , 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛}, and {𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓}.  
The nested control flow example demonstrates that our 
method can be  applicable to complex control flows in which 
the five elementary control flows as shown Table III are used as 
building blocks. However, to do an exhaustive investigation of 
the application of our method to all possible patterns is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
E.  The Overarching Metamodel 
This section abstracts the developed rules of mapping an 
Activity model to a FPC and rules of transforming the FPC to a 
Fault Tree into an Activity model-Fault Propagation 
Chain-Fault Tree (AM-FPC-FT) overarching metamodel as 
depicted in Fig. 6.  
The overarching metamodel is composed of 12 metaclasses 
that are differentiated by a white-grey-dark scale (white, yellow 
and blue for the colored version). On the left, three metaclasses 
(shown in grey), ControlFlow, Action, and ValueSpecification 
(for guard), are inherited from the RAM.  In the middle, four 
metaclasses, as show in white, are introduced for the 
metamodeling of FPCs. In particular, the elementary structure 
of a FPC is in the form of fault events connected by directed 
edges (material implications). Therefore, similar to 
ControlFlow and Action in the RAM, two metaclasses, 
FaultEvent and MaterialImplication are introduced to reflect 
this structure. In addition, FaultEvent in the FPC metamodel is 
further specialized into two types: SingleFault and 
ContractFault. On the right, five metaclasses (shown in dark), 
ORGate, InhibitGate, OutputEvent, BasicEvent, and 
ConditionalEvent, are inherited from the FTM. The 
metaclasses, where relevant, inherit the relations established in 
their domain metamodel. These include the relations between 
the three metaclasses inherited from the RAM. The metamodel 
is developed and depicted in a way such that it also reflects, 
from left to right, the transformation method in which an 
Activity model is mapped into a FPC and then transformed into 
a Fault Tree. 
The mapping from an Activity model to a FPC is captured by 
a stereotype, «contrapositive», which is introduced to refer to 
the Semantic Mapping Rules shown in Table III. As these 
mappings are structure-based rather than component-based, 
instead of associating individual elements, we connect the 
ControlFlow – Action structure to the MaterialImplication – 
FaultEvent structure (circled in dash lines) via the 
«contrapositive» relation. As different elementary control 
flows would give different fault propagation structure, an 
additional note is attached to the «contrapositive» relation to 
indicate the detailed rules as captured in Table III.  
Moving on with the transformation from FPCs to Fault 
Trees, we first define an «equivalence» stereotype to illustrate a 
relation in which an entity is mapped exactly onto another 
entity without the need of modifications. In particular, we have 
three transformations that satisfy an «equivalence» relation: (i) 
Single Fault is mapped exactly onto Basic Event; (ii) 
ContractFault is mapped exactly onto an OutputEvent (as per 
intermediate event); and (iii) Guard information as captured by 
ValueSpecification is mapped exactly onto a ConditionalEvent. 
All of the above exact mappings are apparent from Fig. 3 to Fig. 
4. In addition to the «equivalence» stereotype, we also 
 
(a) 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
(c) 
 
Fig. 5. A nested control flow example with (a) the nested control flow modeled 
in UML Activity; (b) a derived FPC as described in (27) for the nested control 
flow; and (c) The transformed Fault Tree for the nested control flow.  
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introduce an «expansion» stereotype to capture the expansion 
of a contracted fault event into basic events as seen in Fig. 4(c) 
and Fig. 5(c). Since, a contracted fault event contains at least 
two exclusive paths, the multiplicity for the BasicEvent on the 
«expansion» relation is defined as 2⋯∗. Additional notes are 
given to each of these stereotyped relations to provide detail 
explanations on the specific transformation mechanism. 
As seen in the resultant Fault Trees, the transformations 
further impose a specific set of relationships between Fault 
Tree metaclasses. These are captured in the AM-FPC-FT 
metamodel. Firstly, we identify that an OR-gate can be 
connected directly to one or more inhibit-gates as seen in Fig. 
3(c) and Fig. 4(c) due to the expansion of the contracted fault 
event. This is captured by an association between the 
metaclasses ORGate and InhibitGate with multiplicity 1 and 1⋯∗ on each side. Secondly, depending whether a basic event 
is transformed from an Action that is within an exclusive path, 
i.e. proceed from satisfying its guard condition, or not, the basic 
event is either directly connected to an OR-gate or an 
inhibit-gate. Again, corresponding multiplicities are defined 
and additional notes are provided on the associations to provide 
detail explanation. 
VI. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS CASE 
STUDY 
In this section, we evaluate our developed transformation 
method and the AM-FPC-FT overarching metamodel through 
an application of it to the Ramp Meter System (RMS) studied in 
[42],[43].  
A. The System and the Activity Model 
The RMS is a constituent system of a Traffic Management 
System of Systems (TMSoS). The RMS is situated on the 
access ramp used to access inter-urban highways. The RMS 
employs two-phase (red and green) traffic lights to control the 
rate at which vehicles join the highway. The RMS has access to 
data about traffic in its own immediate vicinity as opposed to 
the Traffic Control Center (TCC) which has access to region 
wide traffic data. The RMS can operate in three different modes 
to control the traffic light. These modes are: (i) Fixed-time 
Mode with fixed length of red/green phases; (ii) Responsive 
Mode in which a varying phase is adopted to respond to logical 
traffic; and (iii) Collaborative Mode in which the control 
strategy is provided by the TCC. 
We have modified the Concept of Operation (CoO) of the 
RMS slightly to allow both concurrent control flows and 
alternative control flows to be presented in the Activity model, 
and to avoid control loops that are not within the scope of this 
paper. The RMS begins each traffic light control cycle with 
collecting local data (vehicle flow rate). Then, the RMS starts 
to analyze the data, and concurrently, send the data to the TCC. 
Based on the data received, the TCC will decide whether to 
instruct the RMS to operate in Collaborative Mode. The 
analysis result by the RMS and the instruction from the TCC 
together form the basis on which operational mode, i.e. 
Fixed-time Mode, Responsive Mode, and Collaborative Mode, 
to be selected. The decision logic for mode selection follows 
that TCC Instruction has higher priority over RMS analysis 
result (note that this logic will not be modeled explicitly as they 
are treated as a detailed design at a lower level). The RMS will 
then implement the mode being selected. The successful 
execution of a control cycle will lead to the traffic light to 
operate in a pre-defined mode. The execution of the next 
control cycle may or may not change the mode being 
previously operated.  
To model the behavior of the RMS, a Use Case Diagram, as 
depicted in Fig. 7, is  constructed to capture all of the system 
functions given in the CoO. Then, the functions are ordered into 
control flows based on the details of the CoO. The 
corresponding Activity model is presented in Fig. 8. In the 
 
 
Fig.6. Activity model-Fault Propagation Chain-Fault Tree Overarching Metamodel. 
 
 
 
 
 
Activity model, a system function (action) is modeled by a 
verb-noun phrase with the first letter of the nouns capitalized. 
In addition, a proposition denoted by 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  is used to model the 
completion of the execution of the corresponding system action 
, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. The RMS control flow starts with a “collect Data”(𝐴𝐴1) 
action and flows into pair of fork and join nodes. In between the 
fork and the join node, two concurrent series of actions are 
modeled. One series on the left has a single action, “analyze 
Data”(𝐴𝐴2); and the other series on the right starts with a “send 
Data”(𝐴𝐴3 ) action that leads to an external function, “send 
Instruction”  (𝐴𝐴4 ), owned by the TCC. And then, the series 
flows back to the RMS where RMS shall “receive 
Instruction”(𝐴𝐴5). Immediately after the join node, the control 
flow continues into a “select Mode” (𝐴𝐴6), where the logic of 
mode selection shall be modeled at the next level of detail. 
Once a decision is made, the control flow continues into a pair 
of decision and merge nodes in which three alternative paths 
are modeled. Each path involves an action of a designated mode 
implementation, i.e. “implement Fixed-time Mode” (𝐴𝐴7) with 
“Fixed-time Model selected” (𝑐𝑐7) , “implement Responsive 
Mode”  (𝐴𝐴8) with “Responsive Model selected” (𝑐𝑐8) , and 
“implement Collaborative Mode”  (𝐴𝐴9 ) with “Collaborative 
Model selected” (𝑐𝑐9). With only one out of the three modes 
being implemented at any one time, the RMS then completes 
the control cycle with “control Traffic Light”(𝐴𝐴10) according 
to the operation mode implemented.    
B. RMS Fault Trees 
In the original study of the RMS in [42], five faults of the 
RMS have been identified that could lead to non-optimal traffic 
flow. The faults are: 
1. Lights stuck on green or no lights at all, 
2. RMS fails to adopt Collaborative Mode when instructed, 
3. Lights stuck on red, 
4. RMS fails to exit Collaborative Mode when instructed, 
5. RMS calculates an incorrect rate for vehicles to be 
admitted.  
These five faults can be naturally organized into a 
conventional Fault Tree, as depicted in Fig. 9, with 
“Non-optimal traffic flow” being the top event. Then, the Fault 
Tree separates faults into component-based (Faulty traffic 
light) and functional-based (Operational faults) through a 
top-down deduction. In the rest of this section, we will apply 
the transformation method to the Activity model in Fig. 8 and 
demonstrate how the generated Fault Tree can provide useful 
information in the identification of behavioral faults as well as 
inferring a fault structure. The fault structure is then used to 
analyze the original design model.  
For convenience, we define a set of fault events as the 
negation of the propositions, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ≝ ¬ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 . Based on the semantic 
mapping rules (a), (b) and (c), the initial fault event 𝑎𝑎1 
bifurcates into two chains, (𝑎𝑎1 → 𝑎𝑎2) ∧ (𝑎𝑎1 → 𝑎𝑎3), with one 
chain has a single fault event, 𝑎𝑎2, and the other chain has three 
fault events connected in a series, (𝑎𝑎3 → 𝑎𝑎4) ∧ (𝑎𝑎4 → 𝑎𝑎5). The 
two chains then merge into a single chain that leads to the fault 
event, 𝑎𝑎6 with (𝑎𝑎2 → 𝑎𝑎6) ∧ (𝑎𝑎5 → 𝑎𝑎6). The merged chain then 
continues into a contracted event 𝑎𝑎7,8,9 =  𝑎𝑎7 ∧ 𝑎𝑎8 ∧ 𝑎𝑎9 . The 
contracted fault event, 𝑎𝑎7,8,9, further propagates to the last fault 
event, 𝑎𝑎10 , through the unitary implication 𝑎𝑎7,8,9 → 𝑎𝑎10 . 
Grouping all of the unitary implications together, a complete 
FPC is generated and depicted graphically in Fig. 10. An initial 
point and end point is added to the chain to show where the 
fault propagation starts and ends. These points map to the initial 
node and end node in the original Activity model. 
Next, we transform the FPC to a Fault Tree using the 
established transformation method. The detailed physical 
architecture, i.e. allocation of functions to physical component 
will not be considered. Without going through the detailed 
mathematical derivation, one can obtain the Fault Tree by: 
firstly, elaborating the relations in (19) for the bifurcation and 
convergence of the two parallel chains (𝑎𝑎1 → 𝑎𝑎2) ∧ (𝑎𝑎2 → 𝑎𝑎6)  
 
Fig. 7. The Use Case model of the Ramp Meter System. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. The Activity model of the Ramp Meter System. 
 
 
 
and (𝑎𝑎1 → 𝑎𝑎3) ∧ (𝑎𝑎3 → 𝑎𝑎4) ∧ (𝑎𝑎4 → 𝑎𝑎5) ∧ (𝑎𝑎4 → 𝑎𝑎5) ; and 
then elaborating the relation in (23) for the contracted event, 
𝑎𝑎7,8,9 for three exclusive chains; and finally using the relations 
in (19) again to integrate everything to obtain the final RMS 
Fault Tree as depicted in Fig. 11. The top event of the RMS 
Fault Tree, system failure, 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠, is defined as the system failing to 
complete the intended system behavior as modeled in the UML 
Activity. 
C. Qualitative Analysis of the Transformed Fault Tree 
Without a designated probability for each of the basic events, 
it is difficult to provide a meaningful quantitative analysis. 
Nonetheless, based on the structure of the RMS Fault Tree, we 
provide the following qualitative analyses: 
Firstly, every system function, as modeled by actions, 
becomes a basic (fault) event in the final RMS Fault Tree after 
the transformations. The minimal cut sets are:  {𝑎𝑎1}, {𝑎𝑎2}, {𝑎𝑎3}, {𝑎𝑎4} , {𝑎𝑎5} , {𝑎𝑎6} , {𝑎𝑎7, 𝑐𝑐7} , {𝑎𝑎8, 𝑐𝑐8} , {𝑎𝑎9, 𝑐𝑐9} , and {𝑎𝑎10} . The 
single event minimal cut sets align with the formal 
interpretation of the Activity model based on the UML 
specification where failed execution of an action stops the 
control flow. In addition, fault events 𝑎𝑎7 , 𝑎𝑎8  and 𝑎𝑎9  do not 
individually lead to system failure unless their corresponding 
condition are met. This also aligns with the Activity model in 
which the three alternative paths are exclusive, i.e. only one 
mode is adopted at a time. Hence, despite the detailed structure 
of the Fault Tree, it is obvious that ensuring a high reliability 
for each of the designed system function is a straightforward 
way to minimize the probability of the occurrence of the top 
event.  
Secondly, on the right-hand side of the RMS Fault Tree, the 
set of inhibit-gates used for the contracted fault event, 𝑎𝑎7,8,9, 
implies that the actual contributions from  𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎7), 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎8), and 
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎9)  to 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎7,8,9)  is suppressed subject to the statistical 
probabilities of their corresponding mode selection. For 
instance, if Responsive Mode is rarely selected for a particular 
local RMS, the contribution of 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎8) to the top event will be 
insignificant (note that this is not to say that the “implement 
Responsive Mode” function is insignificant). Reversely, 
ensuring a high reliability for the operational mode mostly 
selected can reduce the top event probability.  
Lastly, on the left-hand side of the RMS Fault Tree, we 
observe that one of the basic event, 𝑎𝑎4, can be considered as an 
external event. Tracing this fault event and its surrounding 
Fault Tree structure to the original functional design, we realize 
that if TCC fails to “send Instruction” to the RMS or the RMS 
fails to “receive Instruction” from the TCC, the system will not 
be able to “select Mode”. Instead of letting the system stuck at 
this point, the designer may want the system to treat this 
situation as if no TCC instruction is received. As such, though 
the local RMS will not operate in an optimal mode, it can 
continue to operate. The designer then has various choices to 
model this mechanism. For instance, the modeling can be done 
through revising the current Activity model to include an 
additional decision point or through embedding this decision 
logic into the next level detail under the function, “select 
Mode”.  
Finally, we compare the transformed Fault Tree in Fig. 11 
with the Fault Tree derived from [42] and depicted in Fig. 9. 
Although the top events in the two Fault Trees are different, we 
recognize that the top event, system failure, 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 , in fact, 
contributes to the top event, non-optimal traffic flow as in Fig. 
9. This is because when system failure happens, vehicles 
entering the ramp would not be controlled under the desired 
strategy; hence leading to a non-optimal traffic flow. In 
addition, overlaps between the two Fault Trees are identified. 
‘Fails to adopt Collaborative Mode’ as captured in the original 
Fault Tree is also captured in the transformed Fault Tree by the 
basic event, 𝑎𝑎9 . However, as suggested by the transformed 
Fault Tree, this fault event itself will not be a minimal cut set. In 
fact, it will only lead to system failure and eventually 
non-optimal flow when the system decides to adopt 
Collaborative Mode. Similarly, the fault event, ‘Fails to exit 
Collaborative Mode’ can be considered as an overlap to 𝑎𝑎7 and 
𝑎𝑎8  collectively in which the system situationally decides to 
adopt one of the two other modes when it is originally in the 
Collaborative Mode. Again, an inhibit-gate is necessary in 
these two cases. From the above arguments, we conclude that 
the developed transformation can firstly identify additional 
basic events based on system behavior models; and secondly 
can provide meaningful revisions to a Fault Tree constructed by 
engineers. From the comparison, it is also clear that due to the 
scope of the transformation method, the transformed Fault Tree 
does not capture component failures and faults that relate to 
objects, e.g. incorrect rate calculation.  
To summarize the case study evaluation, a Fault Tree has 
been successfully generated by applying our transformation 
method to the RMS Activity model. As the generated Fault 
Tree preserves structural knowledge of the original model, we 
are able to analyze qualitatively the Fault Tree to derive 
important system reliability information and provide design 
improvements. By comparing the transformed Fault Tree to the 
 
Fig. 9. A RMS Fault Tree constructed based on the faults identified in [43].  
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one derived based on common practice, the transformation can 
provide meaningful addition and revision. 
D. A Comparison against other Transformation Methods  
This subsection evaluates the method by conducting a 
qualitative comparison against established transformation 
methods. For this comparison, we categorize the established 
transformation methods into two sets. The first set concerns 
with transforming system models developed in standardized 
modeling languages such as UML [18],[19],[20],[21] and 
SysML  [22],[23],[24] to Fault Trees; while the second set 
transforms information modeled in other techniques such as 
diagraphs [4],[5], component-based modeling [2],[3], 
knowledge-based approach [8], and architecture description 
language [44]. Our method is a transformation for system 
models, i.e. it transforms a UML Activity model into a Fault 
Tree. Furthermore, a comparison of the two sets of methods 
would require a comparison between the modeling techniques, 
which would be beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, we 
will only compare our method against the first set of methods. 
 Our method is unique in two ways: firstly, it is the first 
attempt in transforming an Activity model with a focus on 
system behavior and fault propagation; secondly, it has a 
formal basis. In comparison, on the UML side, similar to our 
work, there are methods developed based on system model 
presented in a single type of diagram: Class Diagram in [18]; 
Use Cases in [19] and State Machine in [21]. Some other 
methods developed consider multiple diagrams: for instance, 
[20] has a wider focuses by utilizing UML Composite 
Structure, Sequence and Use Case Diagrams. On the SysML 
side, methods developed in [22] transform information 
captured in SysML Internal Block Diagrams; and the method 
developed in [24] utilizes both Block and Internal Block 
Diagrams. Although many of the above methods have 
considered system behaviors, none of them emphasizes the 
concept of fault propagation that is manifested from control 
flows as modeled in UML or SysML Activities.  
In addition, to facilitate the transformation methods 
developed in most of these works, additional stereotypes are 
introduced to the standard UML and SysML models; whereas 
our method does not.  As such, we argue that the advantage of 
our method is that it reflects exactly the reliability of system 
behavior architecture; while the limitation of the method is that 
it only concerns one type of fault, which is functional failure. 
Additionally, the formal basis of our method, which is lacking 
in the other established methods, could give engineers more 
confidence in the correctness of a generated Fault Tree 
generated by our method.  
We anticipate that a more sophisticated comparison will be 
possible in our future work in which our current method will be 
elaborated to include the consideration of system physical 
architecture modeled, and the allocation of activities to UML 
Classes.  
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper developed a transformation method based on 
propositional logic and probability theory to allow control 
flows modeled in UML Activities to be transformed into 
semantically equivalent Fault Trees. The developed method 
aligns with current industrial practices in early stage system 
assurance [9] and advances existing approaches in terms of 
accommodating system model availability [2],[3] and 
incorporated mathematical rigor [22],[24]. We introduced a 
new concept, FPC, as an intermediate step, to facilitate the 
transformation method. An AM-FPC-FT overarching 
metamodel was then developed to abstract the transformations 
among Activity models, FPC and Fault Trees. The formal basis 
of the transformation method together with the overarching 
metamodel facilitate automated Fault Tree generation. 
Furthermore, the formal basis of the transformation method 
guarantees the generated Fault Tree to be semantically correct. 
Our method reveals an important finding where the formal 
approach suggests that mappings should be based on the 
relational structure between entities and not just 
entity-to-entity.  
To demonstrate and evaluate the applicability of our method, 
the developed transformation method was applied to a Ramp 
Meter System case study previously studied in [42] and [43]. A 
Fault Tree qualitative analysis was then carried out to examine 
the quality of the functional design. Based on the structural 
implications of the RMS Fault Tree, potential alterations were 
suggested. 
 
 
Despite the successful application of the method to the case 
study, there are limitations of the approach presented in this 
work. For instance, loops are particularly useful in modeling 
control systems; but have been deliberately avoided in control 
flows as they do not naturally fit into the structure of a standard 
Fault Tree. Majdara and Wakabayashi in [2] also suggested that 
events that are encountered repeatedly can lead to an infinite 
loop structure in a Fault Tree. Therefore, it is essential to 
resolve this issue with the usage of UML Structured Activity 
Nodes, such as LoopNode in a future work.  
Furthermore, because the current state of the approach is 
concerned with only propositional logic and control flows, the 
transformation method is not applicable to object flows and 
only considers one type of fault, i.e. a system function fails to 
complete execution. As such, to make our method more widely 
applicable, three pathways are envisioned to extend the current 
work. These are extensions of the transformation of control 
flows to:  (i) object flows, (ii) State Machines, and (iii) 
functional allocations. The following discusses each pathway 
in more details. With these extensions, it should then be 
possible to evaluate the reliability of the transformed Fault Tree 
in great depth by comparing it to similar works.  
Object flow, which was not included in the scope of our 
current work, is the other important aspect of UML Activities. 
Errors presented in an Object, e.g. incorrect data, that are 
passed between system components may lead to undesired 
system behaviors such as malfunctions in addition to the fault 
events concerned in the current work. Developing a formal 
representation of Objects and their associated faults can be 
challenging. It is anticipated that the use of Predicate Calculus 
to capture states of an Object can provide insights in the 
inclusion of object flows. 
The modeling of system behavior is also concerned with the 
modeling of system states. In UML, these system states are 
modeled using State Machines. As the executions of system 
functions are closely related to the changing of system states, 
transformation between the two types of behavioral models 
could provide insights in elaborating our current 
transformations to further consume State Machines as system 
behavioral models. It would be also useful to utilize and 
elaborate other existing works such as [21]. 
 
Fig. 11. The RMS Fault Tree transformed from the Fault Propagation Chain in Fig. 10. 
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Lastly, in practice, system functions are implemented in 
physical components. Therefore, it is essential to extend the 
current method to include aspects related to system components 
and functional allocations. UML uses Classes to model the 
system structure, system components and functional 
allocations. Hence, it is natural to elaborate the current work to 
develop transformation methods that map system structures and 
components modeled using Classes into semantically 
equivalent Fault Trees. This should further advance existing 
approaches detailed in [18], [22] and [24].  
APPENDIX I 
To demonstrate that the FPC in Fig. 5(b) indeed maps into 
the Fault Tree depicted in Fig. 5(c), we perform a detailed 
probability analysis for this FPC. Again, we use the concept of 
running the system for n times and observing the number of 
system failure. 
By running the system for n times, based on the derivation of 
(14), the expected number of system failure, 𝑞𝑞1, upto the point 
at 𝑎𝑎0+ can be determined as, 
 
𝑞𝑞1 = 𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0),         (28) 
 
The FPC then bifurcates into two chains with exlusive 
conditions after the fault event, 𝑎𝑎0 . The number of system 
success that goes through the top chain with condition, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, can 
be calculated as, 
 
𝑚𝑚 = 𝑛𝑛�1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0)�𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖),      (29) 
 
Then, we can calculate the additional number of system failure 
at 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+ as, 
 
𝑞𝑞2 = 𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖),         (30) 
 
and the additional number of system failure at 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛+ as,  
 
𝑞𝑞3 = 𝑚𝑚�1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)�𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛�,     (31) 
 
where 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛� is the probability of the contracted fault event, 
𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛, and can be calculated based on the formula derived in 
(18). Using (28) to (31), we can calculate 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛+� by 
 
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛+� = 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑞𝑞3𝑛𝑛  = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0) + �1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0)�𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) �𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) + �1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)�𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛�� = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0) + �1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0)�𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∪ 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛� = 𝑃𝑃 �𝑎𝑎0 ∪ �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∩ �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∪ 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛��� = 𝑃𝑃 �𝑎𝑎0 ∪ �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∩ �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∪ �(𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 ∩ 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚) ∪ (𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ∩ 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛)����,   (31) 
 
where the last step has used the derived result provided in (23) 
for a contracted fault event. 
For the bottom chain, condition 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 is required to proceed to 
𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗. Hence, similar to (29), the number of system success that 
goes through the bottom chain with condition, 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 , can be 
calculated as, 
 
𝑚𝑚′ = 𝑛𝑛�1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0)�𝑃𝑃�𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗�,       (32) 
 
Then, we can calculate the additional number of system failure 
at 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗+ as, 
 
𝑞𝑞4 = 𝑚𝑚′𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗�,        (33) 
 
and the additional number of system failure at 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+ as,  
 
𝑞𝑞5 = 𝑚𝑚′ �1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗�� 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛),     (34) 
 
Using (28), (32) to (34), we can calculate 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+) by, 
  
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+) = 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑞𝑞4 + 𝑞𝑞5𝑛𝑛  = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0) + �1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0)�𝑃𝑃�𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗� �𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� + �1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗��𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛)� = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0) + �1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎0)�𝑃𝑃�𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗�𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∪ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗� = 𝑃𝑃 �𝑎𝑎0 ∪ �𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 ∩ �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∪ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗���.             (35) 
 
For the convergence of the two chains, we use the third 
relation in (15) and in (19), to obtain 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓−�, where 
 
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓−� = 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛+� + 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+) − 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛+�𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+�𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛+� = 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛+ ∪ 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+�,            (36) 
 
with 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛+)𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+|𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛+)  containing the repeated events, 
𝑎𝑎0. Finally, we simply use the derived relation in (12) to obtain 
the top event probability, 𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠), as 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓+� = 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓−� + 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓� − 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓−�𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓� = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓− ∪ 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓).              (37) 
 
In the above transformations, we have used basic events, 𝑎𝑎0, 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 , 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 , and 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 ; conditional events, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 , 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 , 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 , and 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 ; 
and specifically defined intermediate events 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛+, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+, and 
𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓− . Representing relations in (31), (35), (36), and (37) all 
together gives the Fault Tree depicted in Fig. 5(c).  
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